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Dedication
As Gale Cincotta’s life was coming to an end, she
admonished NTIC to “Get the Crooks.”  In that spirit, this
report is intended to shine light on the practices the “crooks”
use to steal a family’s wealth, leaving broken dreams and
social problems in their wake.
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As the foreclosure crisis unfolds it is
becoming increasing clear that what NTIC,
community groups and consumer advocates
have been saying since the late 1990’s is now
being proved right:  predatory sub-prime loans
have and are ravaging our neighborhoods,
robbing families of wealth, and destroying
futures.  Not surprisingly, now that major Wall
Street firms are being forced to report
unprecedented losses, confirming our warnings
to regulators and the industry, the foreclosure
crisis and the need to do something about it is
now moving from the back-burner.  Yet the focus
remains more on Wall Street than on Main Street.
How did we get here?  Gramm-Leach-Blyle
Financial Modernization Act opened the gate into
dangerous experimentation in the subprime
market.  Brokers began shifting from FHA-
insured loans to conventional sub-prime loans.
Low-documentation and no-documentation loans
began to proliferate.  New schemes to “juice”
loans (i.e. pack loans with financed fees) became
common place.  The expansion of
homeownership became a good in and of itself
without safeguards and without the expansion of
financial counseling resources.  Loan products
that had existed for years but, which were
reserved for only a narrow range of special needs
customers, entered the mainstream.
“Bad credit? No problem” marketing
campaigns filled the airwaves, hawked by sports
figures.  Internationally renowned rock-and-roll
tours were sponsored by now defunct industry
shooting stars.  The industry madness to
maintain or gain market share led to a frenzied
push to refinance borrowers.  Borrowers were
told, “Put the equity in your house to work,”
“Payoff those credit card bills,” “Take that
vacation,” and “[Refinance with us,] it’s the
biggest no brainer in the history of earth.”
Now, as then, the industry often blames
borrowers.  After all, the argument goes, they
signed the papers—they should not have done
that if they didn’t understand what they were
doing.  The industry, on defense, now
conveniently forgets that there was often a broker
there representing the industry and willing to say
anything to make sure the borrower signed the
deal.  His or her compensation was based solely
on completing the transaction.
The real story behind the foreclosure crisis is
that many homeowners were sold a bill of goods,
advised to use their homes (to use the words that
one Wall Street executive actually used recently)
as “ATM machines” by the brokers’
advertisements, and advised to take unsecured
credit card debt and other installment credit and
secure it with the single most important asset
most families have—their home.
While the losses mount on Wall Street and
at other financial institutions, the impact of the
foreclosure crisis on neighborhoods and
individual families will likely be quickly forgotten
by the industry and national public policy makers.
The hard earned wealth senior citizens and other
families lost through equity-stripping schemes are
gone forever and may strain public and private
safety net programs.  Credit scores for these
families may take years to recover, decreasing
access to jobs, insurance, financial services and
housing.  Many families may struggle with
unnecessarily burdensome loans that may not
result in foreclosure but will drain resources.
Neighborhoods will suffer from the rise of
foreclosures, crime associated with abandoned
buildings, the influx of properties for sale, and the
decrease in housing values.  Cities and counties
will suffer from decreased tax rolls and rising
costs for law enforcement and fire fighting.
All in all, the binge into sub-prime lending will
have serious ramifications for many years to
come.  And many will be reminded that the
problem with being right is that you often wish
that you weren’t.
Prequel:  The Problem
with Being Right
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This analysis looks at foreclosures in the City
of Chicago and surrounding areas for the first
half of 2007.1  The analysis serves as an update
to the periodic analyses published by NTIC since
1999.  The analysis confirms that the foreclosure
crisis in the Chicago area is being driven by
ARMs that include:
· Interest-only loans, in which the borrower
is required to pay only the interest accumulated
on the loan each month.   The borrower is not
required to make any payment on the actual
amount borrowed so that at the end of the loan
the full loan amount is due.
· Payment-option loans, in which the
borrower can choose to make a minimum
payment, similar in concept to the minimum
payment on a credit card. At the end of the loan,
the amount due may be greater that the original
loan amount (a situation called negative
amorization).
· “Teaser” or “Introductory Rate,” in which
the borrower enjoys an initial low interest rate
(sometimes as low as 1%) for the first few
months or year.  At the end of the introductory
period the interest rate may increase
substantially leading to “payment shock,” an often
huge increase in the required monthly payment.
· Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs) that
only adjust upward, in which the interest rate
adjusts upward according to a schedule
regardless of what happens to interest rates in
general.
In addition to looking at the interest rate
characteristics of mortgages that fell into
foreclosures during the first six months of 2007,
the analysis looks at how foreclosures are
concentrated in certain communities.  West
Englewood had the most foreclosures per square
mile that any other community area in Chicago
and Bellwood had the most foreclosures per
square mile that any other suburb.
This report concludes with a summary of
NTIC’s recommendations for dealing with the
foreclosure crisis in Chicagoland and across the
country.  More information about NTIC’s Save the
Executive Summary
1 The source of raw data for this analysis came from the Foreclosure Report of Chicago and Public-Record.com.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A glimpse at the map of Chicago with each
new foreclosure case marked by a red dot makes
it clear that foreclosures are not distributed
evenly across the city.  Viewing the simple
concentration statistic of foreclosure cases per
square mile in each of Chicago’s 77 community
areas (see table on next page) drives this point
home and helps to demonstrate just how
devastating foreclosures can be to a
neighborhood and its homeowners.
Each foreclosure case
represents a family who is 90 days
or more delinquent on their
mortgage payment.  This is likely
not the only payment on which
they are behind-—a reality which
effects the economies of these
neighborhoods and their local
businesses.  If these families
Finding 1:  Foreclosures continue to be concentrated on the
west and south sides of Chicago and West Englewood has
more than 111 foreclosures per square mile.
ultimately lose their homes—whether through
foreclosure or a third-party sale—”for sale”
properties will flood the market in these
neighborhoods reducing housing values and
increasing the difficulty of selling homes.
Slumping real estate markets increase the
likelihood of abandonment, vandalism, increased
crime, and fire rates and reduce property tax
revenue.
National Training and Information Center Page 4
Concentration of New Foreclosure Cases by Community Area
67 West Englewood 220 348 58.2% 70.3 111.2
68 Englewood 191 276 44.5% 62.2 89.9
43 South Shore 153 215 40.5% 51.9 72.9
38 Grand Boulevard 80 122 52.5% 46.5 70.9
26 West Garfield Park 86 89 3.5% 67.7 70.1
66 Chicago Lawn 146 242 65.8% 41.5 68.8
53 West Pullman 211 228 8.1% 58.1 62.8
49 Roseland 202 277 37.1% 41.9 57.5
71 Auburn Gresham 154 207 34.4% 41.2 55.3
42 Woodlawn 81 115 42.0% 37.9 53.7
69 Greater Grand Crossing 126 188 49.2% 35.6 53.1
23 Humboldt Park 124 189 52.4% 34.5 52.6
46 South Chicago 119 169 42.0% 35.7 50.8
25 Austin 301 345 14.6% 42.3 48.5
73 Washington Heights 123 136 10.6% 43.2 47.7
61 New City 117 221 88.9% 24.2 45.7
39 Kenwood 30 49 63.3% 27.8 45.4
27 East Garfield Park 65 87 33.8% 33.5 44.8
29 North Lawndale 106 142 34.0% 33.1 44.4
08 Near North 95 112 17.9% 34.9 41.2
44 Chatham 112 116 3.6% 38.0 39.3
45 Avalon Park 66 48 -27.3% 52.8 38.4
40 Washington Park 32 57 78.1% 21.1 37.5
48 Calumet Heights 36 66 83.3% 20.5 37.5
77 Edgewater 39 64 64.1% 22.8 37.4
37 Fuller Park 10 26 160.0% 14.1 36.6
20 Hermosa 23 42 82.6% 19.8 36.2
75 Morgan Park 95 101 6.3% 30.0 31.9
19 Belmont Craigin 85 122 43.5% 21.7 31.2
70 Ashburn 105 145 38.1% 21.7 30.0
01 Rogers Park 32 55 71.9% 17.4 29.9
65 West Lawn 45 80 77.8% 15.2 27.0
32 Loop 28 42 50.0% 17.8 26.8
47 Burnside 13 16 23.1% 21.0 25.8
18 Montclaire 15 25 66.7% 15.2 25.3
22 Logan Square 43 90 109.3% 12.0 25.2
02 West Ridge 41 87 112.2% 11.7 24.8
63 Gage Park 49 55 12.2% 22.0 24.7
15 Portage Park 32 94 193.8% 8.1 23.8
14 Albany Park 23 45 95.7% 12.0 23.4
16 Irving Park 30 73 143.3% 9.3 22.7
21 Avondale 25 43 72.0% 12.6 21.7
62 West Elston 18 25 38.9% 15.4 21.4
03 Uptown 33 49 48.5% 14.1 20.9
58 Brighton Park 29 56 93.1% 10.7 20.7
35 Douglas 29 29 0.0% 17.5 17.5
30 South Lawndale 37 79 113.5% 8.1 17.4
24 West Town 64 79 23.4% 14.0 17.3
17 Dunning 39 64 64.1% 10.5 17.2
06 Lakeview 31 54 74.2% 9.9 17.2
33 Near South Side 23 28 21.7% 13.2 16.1
41 Hyde Park 20 26 30.0% 11.9 15.5
36 Oakland 4 9 125.0% 6.8 15.3
64 Clearing 18 37 105.6% 7.1 14.6
50 Pullman 22 29 31.8% 10.4 13.7
72 Beverly 30 43 43.3% 9.4 13.5
60 Bridgeport 23 26 13.0% 11.0 12.4
11 Jefferson Park 20 28 40.0% 8.6 12.0
07 Lincoln Park 18 37 105.6% 5.6 11.4
28 Near West Side 31 62 100.0% 5.4 10.9
56 Garfield Ridge 35 44 25.7% 8.3 10.4
04 Lincoln Square 13 26 100.0% 5.1 10.2
52 East Side 25 28 12.0% 8.8 9.8
74 Mount Greenwood 12 24 100.0% 4.4 8.9
10 Norwood Park 22 36 63.6% 5.2 8.5
59 Mckinley Park 9 11 22.2% 6.4 7.8
05 North Center 13 14 7.7% 6.3 6.8
13 North Park 8 15 87.5% 3.2 6.0
31 Lower West Side 16 17 6.3% 5.5 5.8
57 Archer Heights 13 10 -23.1% 6.5 5.0
51 South Deering 57 51 -10.5% 5.2 4.7
76 O'Hare 7 14 100.0% 2.2 4.4
09 Edison Park 6 5 -16.7% 5.2 4.3
12 Forest Glen 10 13 30.0% 3.1 4.1
34 Armour Square 1 3 200.0% 1.0 3.1
55 Hegewisch 16 14 -12.5% 3.0 2.7
54 Riverdale 3 5 66.7% 0.9 1.4
City of Chicago 4464 6339 42.0% 19.4 27.5
Community Area
1st Half Foreclosure 




Foreclosure Cases Started from January 
through June
2006 2007
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Foreclosure starts during the first six months
of 2007 have risen 76% over the same period in
2000.  Both increases have been somewhat
mitigated by a decrease in the number of new
cases started on government-insured loans (FHA
and VA).
Finding 2:  In the first six months of 2007, foreclosure starts
have increased 42% over the same period in 2006.
Since the effective date of the Illinois High
Risk Home Loan Act (January 1, 2004), which
attempted to reign in high cost mortgages,
foreclosure starts in the first six months of 2007
are more than twice what they were over the
same period in 2004.
New Foreclosures Starts in City of Chicago
By Loan Type





Conventional 2,513 2,325 3,594 2,894 2,721 2,836 3,916 5,647 125% 44%
Government Insured 855 982 1,138 859 591 427 264 196 -77% -26%
Other 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 -          -          
Not Reported 240 654 883 271 239 197 284 495 106% 74%
3,608 3,961 5,615 4,025 3,552 3,460 4,464 6,339 76% 42%
1st Half Foreclosure Starts
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Finding 3:  More than 88% of foreclosure cases are on loans
not covered by the Illinois High Risk Home Loan Act.
With the push for a state law that resulted in
Illinois instituting regulations (effective in 2003)
on high cost loans and strengthened by the High
Risk Home Loan Act (effective January 1, 2004),
the share of high cost loans in foreclosure starts
have generally decreased.  High cost loan
foreclosures over the first six months of each
year peaked in 2002 and decreased through
2006.  In the first half of 2007, new foreclosure
cases on high cost loans increased by 8% over
the same period in 2006.  New foreclosure cases
on loans with reported interest rates between 3%
and 6% of the Treasury rate nearly double during
the first half of 2007.
New Foreclosure Starts in City of Chicago
on Conventional Loans by Interest Rate Level





519 546 755 654 921 1,332 2,102 2,429 368% 16%
1,136 1,235 1,937 1,415 1,263 1,108 1,541 3,005 165% 95%
High Cost (6% and above) 461 511 768 393 225 169 158 170 -63% 8%
Not Reported 637 687 1,017 703 551 424 399 538 -16% 35%
2,753 2,979 4,477 3,165 2,960 3,033 4,200 6,142 123% 46%
Conventional and N/A Loans by 
Interest Rate Level
Prime (3% or below)
Subprime (between 3% and 6%)
1st Half Foreclosure Starts on Conventional Loans









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Prime (3% or below)
Subprime (between 3% and 6%)
High Cost (6% and above)
Not Reported
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Finding 4:  71% of all foreclosure starts on non-government-
insured loans during the first six months of 2007 were on
young loans with ARM or balloon payment characteristics.
Young loans are less than 24 months old
and are often caused by fraud or abusive
lending practices at origination.  This high
percentage (calculated by using the table in
Finding 2 and 3) of foreclosures on young loans
is indicative of lending practices designed to get
borrowers to take out loans without regard to
their ability to pay back the loans.  96% of these
new foreclosure cases were on loans not likely
to be covered by the Illinois High Risk Home
Loans Act.  Even more disturbing is that new
foreclosures on young loans during the first half
of 2007 grew 45% over the same period in
2006.
New Foreclosure Starts in City of Chicago
on Young Conventional Loans by Interest Rate Level





174 184 231 222 399 820 1,587 1,655 851% 4%
723 798 1,286 965 927 857 1,289 2,538 251% 97%
High Cost (6% and above) 233 293 426 218 78 43 65 87 -63% 34%
Not Reported 50 88 110 83 47 47 51 72 44% 41%
1,180 1,363 2,053 1,488 1,451 1,767 2,992 4,352 269% 45%
Young Loans with ARMs or 
Balloons
Prime (3% or below)
Subprime (between 3% and 6%)
1st Half Foreclosure Starts on Young Conventional Loans








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Prime (3% or below)
Subprime (between 3% and 6%)
High Cost (6% and above)
Not Reported
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Finding 5:  Foreclosures are not just a city problem.  Many
suburbs have high concentrations of foreclosure cases.
The table below shows suburban
communities ranked by the number of new
foreclosure cases filed during the first six
months of 2007 per square mile.  The list
includes all suburbs with 20 or more
foreclosure starts per square mile.  The list is
dominated by near west and southern
suburbs.
Policy Recommendations to Save the
American Dream
American Dream Campaign can be found at
www.savetheamericandream.org.
NTIC and affiliate organizations from
around the country launched the Save the
American Dream Campaign on September 26,
2007 in the Cleveland zip code with the most
foreclosures in the country.  The campaign
recommends immediate relief to keep families
in their homes, to stop abusive lending and to
build homeownership on a solid foundation.
More detail on the campaign is on the following
page.
Near western and southern suburbs have
a high density of foreclosures
Rank City or Village 2006 2007 2006 2007
1 Bellwood 71 103 45.1% 29.8 43.3
2 Stone Park 9 13 44.4% 27.3 39.4
3 Dolton 172 171 -0.6% 36.9 36.7
4 Maywood 103 96 -6.8% 38.1 35.6
5 Wilmington 24 28 16.7% 30.4 35.4
6 Hazel Crest 116 112 -3.4% 34.1 32.9
7 Calumet Park 32 36 12.5% 28.1 31.6
8 Berwyn 85 120 41.2% 21.9 30.8
9 Cicero 114 175 53.5% 19.5 30.0
10 Elmwood Park 33 56 69.7% 17.4 29.5
11 Calumet City 158 216 36.7% 21.4 29.3
12 Country Club Hills 123 134 8.9% 26.6 28.9
13 Harvey 162 177 9.3% 26.2 28.6
14 Park Forest 109 138 26.6% 22.2 28.0
15 Chicago 4464 6339 42.0% 19.4 27.5
16 Round Lake 64 88 37.5% 17.9 24.6
17 Riverdale 89 92 3.4% 23.5 24.3
18 Richton Park 76 82 7.9% 22.4 24.2
19 Carpentersville 99 165 66.7% 13.0 21.7
20 Phoenix 9 9 0.0% 20.0 20.0
21 Plainfield 188 248 31.9% 15.1 20.0
First Half Foreclosure 
Cases Change 
2006-07
Foreclosure Cases per 
square mile







Save the American Dream is an aggressive foreclosure prevention campaign to  
stop the wide-spread effects of foreclosure on families, neighborhoods and the 
economy. 
 
Save the American Dream calls for three critical solutions:  
 
1. Immediate Relief to Keep Families in their Homes 
 
 Stop massive interest rate hikes (subprime ARM resets) and modify loans to they are 
permanently affordable.   
 Wall Street investors must donate money towards the Save the American Dream Foreclosure 
Prevention Fund.  
 Mortgage lenders must create a Refinance Loan Product for homeowners who are stuck in an 
unaffordable loan. 
 The mortgage industry must adopt universal loan workout options. 
 
2.   Stop Abusive Lending 
 
 The President and Congress must enact comprehensive protections for homeowners and 
enforce criminal penalties on any broker or lender knowingly engaging in abusive practices.   
 The President and Congress must not pre-empt strong state and local homeowner protection 
laws.     
 HUD must amend RESPA to require lenders to provide the final HUD-1 to borrowers 72 hours 
in advance of the closing. 
 President and Congress must enact assignee 
liability for all parties involved in a loan.  
 Require all mortgage lending institutions to 
create a foreclosure risk officer position. 
 Regulate and license mortgage brokers. 
 
3. Build Homeownership on a Solid 
Foundation 
 
 Expand the Community Reinvestment Act so 
that all mortgage originators are regulated 
under the CRA. 
 Regulators must modernized CRA to hold all 







Inez Killingsworth, NTIC Board Member was joined by over 100 
residents, allies and press at the Cleveland launch on Sept. 26.  
Cleveland is a city well known for its alarming rate of foreclosures. 
Save  the American  Dream 
A campaign of the National Training and Information Center • 810 N. Milwaukee Ave., Chicago, IL 60622 • 312-243-3035 • www.ntic-us.org 
 
Visit the Save the American Dream 
website and blog: 
http://www.savetheamericandream.org 
